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Pursuing a Business Fraud RICO Claim
MICHAEL A. BERTZ*©
L Why Pursue a RICO Claim?
Upon initial review of what were once your client's mid-six figure
securities accounts,' and now, fifteen months later, are only one-
quarter that size, you note to the client that there appears to have
been extensive churning2 of his accounts. Furthermore, the state-
ments made by the broker that he had direct information, not yet in
the marketplace, about a pending merger of a company upon which
he recommended sizeable stock purchases (resulting in significant
losses), appear to have been false. Additionally, the statements by
the broker explaining the lack of commission charges on a large
number of confirmations, that the brokerage firm was trying to help
its customer make up some of his losses by not charging or taking
income on those transactions, also appear to be false in that sub-
stantial mark-ups were charged and income was taken on those
principal trades entered into directly with the firm. Finally, the ac-
countings provided to your client from time to time, of the equity in
his accounts, appear to be false. Your client has also brought to
your attention a number of large trades toward the end of the exist-
ence of his accounts which he states were not authorized by him,
the circumstances of which raise questions of whether the broker
was "parking" those securities in his customer's accounts as part of
broader manipulatory conduct. Additionally, your client has indi-
cated that he is aware of at least two other customers of the same
broker who are complaining of similar handling of their accounts.
* Former trial attorney for the Securities and Exchange Commission (1969
through August, 1975); former representative of the SEC to the Los Angeles Organized
Crime Strike Force (1972 through August, 1975); former Special Attorney for the
United States Department of Justice (1974 through December, 1975). Copyright 1985.
1. While the hypothetical facts used as a reference in this Article are those of a
pervasive customer securities fraud, the discussion should be equally applicable to any
business fraud matter, including those in which infiltration and/or Zontrol of an enter-
prise is involved. It should be noted at the outset, however, that Senator Strom Thur-
mond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has expresed his intent to seek
hearings on the proliferation of civil suits of the type discussed here. See Federal Securi-
ties Law Reports, (CCH) No. 1109 (Jan. 23, 1985).
2, Excessive transactions for the purpose of generating commissions and other
charges for the benefit of the broker in disregard of the interest of the customer. See
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1980); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
430 F.2d 1203, 1206-1207 (9th Cir. 1970).
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The client reacts emotionally, clarifying for you that these are
funds developed over a period of years for retirement purposes, and
that he is concerned about "putting good money after bad" in pay-
ing the costs of a lawsuit. His major concern, however, is whether,
if he does go through the financial and emotional strain of litiga-
tion, he will be able to retrieve at least some of his losses after de-
ducting the expenses of the lawsuit.
Knowing that only actual damages are available for charges of
fraud under the securities laws, which do not provide for recovery
of costs and attorney's fees,3 and that punitive damages awardable
under a breach of fiduciary duty claim 4 are seldom rendered in such
cases, you consider whether charging a pattern of unlawful conduct
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), which allows for payment of costs and attorney's fees as
well as for treble damages, may be a means of satisfying your cli-
ent's concerns and desires.
However, to avoid some of the costly negative results obtained
where a RICO claim is just dropped into an otherwise viable ac-
tion,5 consideration must first be given to (1) proper pleading of the
facts of the case to the particular elements required by RICO, (2)
court developed roadblocks to civil RICO actions, and (3) ethical
and practical concerns relevant to deciding whether to proceed with
a RICO claim.
This Article will attempt to assist counsel who may pursue a
Civil RICO claim in regard to these considerations by focusing
upon issues raised in relation to the hypothetical client.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PLEADING THE ELEMENTS
OF RICO
A. The Importance of Proper Pleading in a RICO Action
While RICO was intended in significant part "[T]o seek the erad-
ication of organized crime in the United States . . .by providing
• . .new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those en-
3. Securities Act of 1933 Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Section 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
4. Mihara, 619 F.2d at 826; Miley, 637 F.2d at 329-32.
5. See, e.g., the Amended Class Action Complaint in Hokama v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983) where well-developed pleadings of securities
claims were followed by a one page RICO claim with minimal pleading of facts to
elements. After correctly noting that Congress had rejected limiting RICO to members
of known criminal organizations in order to avoid constitutional problems of grounding
liability upon membership in a group, the court nonetheless dismissed this RICO claim
upon its conclusion that it was "implausible" that Congress meant to create a treble
damage claim against "ordinary" businesses or parties. Id. at 643. See infra notes 51-
53, 66-68 and accompanying text.
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gaged in organized crime,"' 6 use of the new "Civil remedies" has
been frustrated in part by conflicting court decisions, particularly in
actions charging defendants with business fraud.
A review of a number of the complaints upon which RICO
claims have been dismissed reflects that an old adage, that weak
facts and/or pleadings make bad law, has contributed to negative
decisions which are then cited by other courts with the effect of
thwarting RICO's express purposes of providing strong remedies to
deal with the kinds of conduct Congress sought to attack through
RICO.7 In addition to the effect weak pleadings have on the devel-
6. The entire quote reads: "[T]o seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by es-
tablishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." The
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 923. See
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
As noted by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School,
Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
United States Senate in 1969 through 1970, when the Organized Crime Control Act was
processed, Senator Hruska introduced a forerunner to what finally became RICO by
stating: "The bill, he said, attacked 'the economic power' of organized crime 'on two
fronts---criminal and civil,' but that the 'criminal provision. . .[was] intended primar-
ily as an adjunct to the civil provision' which he 'consider[ed]. . .the more important
feature' of the bill. Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action In Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Blakey,
Reflections]. For an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, of which RICO is a part, see id. at 249-80. See also In re
Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc. Securities Litigation, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1422-
37 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
7. See, e.g., Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984) where the court
stated:
The RICO claim in the first amended complaint alleges only
"The scheme to defraud, false claims through fraud and activities by de-
fendants as alleged in the facts of this Complaint, were in violation of the
Federal Anti-Racketeering Statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962.
"Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1964, plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of treble
damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees."
All other allegations of the complaint are incorporated by reference.
Id. at 480.
The court thereupon stated as a basis of affirming dismissal of the RICO claim:
"Rae's complaint does not allege that any defendants were associated with or employed
by an enterprise, nor does it identify the requisite RICO enterprise." Id. at 480-81. The
court also stated that: "No predicate offenses are identified in the complaint or exhib-
its." Id. at 481. It appears from the description of the complaint that no pattern of
racketeering activity, scienter, or causal relationship between any racketeering activity
and damages were alleged.
Therefore, dismissal of the complaint in the Rae case was proper upon a review of
that complaint as against elements easily identified from the language of RICO without
venturing into any issues of elements not found within that language. See infra notes 8-
45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of RICO.
However, the court additionally stated:
Rae apparently is now arguing that Union Bank was the enterprise with
whom the individual appellees interacted. See Appellant's Brief at 25-26. If
Union Bank is the enterprise, it cannot also be the RICO defendant. See
3
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opment of a new law such as RICO, a review of complaints contain-
ing poorly developed RICO claims also highlights the need for care
in the drafting of pleadings in order to avoid dismissal for inadver-
tent failure to satisfy a required RICO element.
B. Elements Identified in the Text of RICO
The starting point of our analysis is a close look at the statute
through which relief will be sought for the client. The pertinent
portions of RICO as applied to our hypothetical client provide the
framework for relief where a person is injured in his property as a
result of a pattern of mail, wire and/or securities fraud which has
been engaged in as a part of the conduct of the affairs of an enter-
prise with which the persons charged are employed or associated.
This framework is provided through (1) definitions of "racketeering
activity" (a list of criminal acts including "indictable" mail and
wire fraud and "punishable" fraud in the sale of securities"), "per-
son, .... enterprise," and "pattern of racketeering activity";8 (2) iden-
United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation, 689 F.2d 1181, 1182, 1190
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983)
("We conclude that 'enterprise' was meant to refer to a being different from,
not the same as or part of, the person whose behavior the act was designed to
prohibit .. "). Thus, Rae can state no RICO cause of action against Union
Bank itself.
Id. at 481.
While the complaint in Rae is deficient on its face, this otherwise unnecessary analy-
sis of the "enterprise" issue based upon the United States v. Computer Sciences Corpo-
ration decision is unfortunate in that the court disregarded the rationale given in United
States v. Computer Sciences Corporation for that ruling that: "[W]e would not take
seriously, in the absence, at least, of very explicit statutory language, an assertion that a
defendant could conspire with his right arm, which held, aimed and fired the fatal
weapon." 689 F.2d at 1190 (emphasis added). This reasoning confuses two entirely
different concepts. While as a general rule an entity may not conspire with itself, or
with its own subdivision as was charged in United States v. Computer Sciences Corpo-
ration, that rule should merely apply to cause dismissal of the RICO conspiracy count
under section 1962(d) in the indictment in that case. The rule does not, however, aid in
identifying the "enterprise" through which parties may violate sections 1962(a),
1962(b), or 1962(c) of RICO. Compare the discussion of whether the same entity may
be both the "enterprise" and a defendant in United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986-
990 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 399-403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53
U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-822); and B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co.,
Inc., No. 84-5087, slip op. at 10-13 (3d Cir. 1984).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Definitions
As used in this chapter -
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kid-
napping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from inter-
state shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664
4
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tification of the unlawful conduct which is deemed "Prohibited
activit[y]"; 9 and a statement of the "Civil remedies" available to an
injured person. 10
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), sec-
tion 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), sec-
tion 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to trafficking in contra-
band cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),*(C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section
501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds) or (D) any offense involv-
ing fraud connected with a case under title 11,fraud in the sale of securities, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, sell-
ing, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable
under any law of the United States [emphasis added];
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in the property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, . . . the last of which occurred within ten years. . . after commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity;
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Prohibited activities
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
Other business frauds may involve conduct which would fall within one or more of
the other parts of section 1962, including:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived
. . . from a pattern of racketeering activity. . . to use or invest. . . any part
of such income. . . in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise. ...
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity . . . to acquire or maintain . . . any interest in or control of any
enterprise. ...
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
One common pleading error has been to include all four subsections when one or
more is inapplicable on the facts, resulting in equally careless courts requiring invest-
ment of racketeering income and/or control of an enterprise through racketeering activ-
ity along with conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, while each alone will support civil relief under the statute as written. See infra
notes 33-41 and accompanying text for discussion of "The 'Enterprise.'"
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Civil remedies
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
5
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While many courts require the pleading of additional elements,I'
the text of RICO dictates that the following elements must be pled
in the context of our particular hypothetical fact pattern in order
for a remedy to be available:
(1) A person, who may be either;
(a) an individual; or
(b) an entity;
(2) which person is employed by or associated with any
enterprise;
(3) which enterprise is engaged in, or the activities of which af-
fect, interstate commerce;
(4) which person conducts or participates in the conduct of the
affairs of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity which consists of at least two acts within ten years of each
other which are indictable as mail or wire fraud, or which are
offenses involving fraud in the sale of securities punishable under
the provisions of the federal securities laws; and
(5) which conduct results in injury to the property of the
plaintiff.
C. Construing the Statute
In seeking dismissal of RICO claims, many decisions upon which
defendants most heavily rely disregard basic rules of statutory con-
struction in applying the statute to the facts at hand. Therefore,
consideration of certain rules of construction applicable to our hy-
pothetical client's situation is appropriate before discussing the
pleading of particular elements of RICO in greater detail. Since the
factual allegations of a complaint must be taken as true in consider-
ing a motion to dismiss, 12 the propriety of the client's RICO claim
will turn upon the extent to which the factual allegations made in
the complaint comply with what Congress provided by way of civil
remedies in RICO.
As stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette:13
"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language.
If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive' [citations]."
Despite continuous references to RICO as being an "ambiguous"
law,14 in Zanelli v. United States, the Supreme Court characterized
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
11. See discussion of "Court Developed Roadblocks to Actions Under RICO-A
Disfavored Law," infra notes 46-100 and accompanying text.
12. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
13. 452 U.S. at 580.
14. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
6
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the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, of which RICO is a part,
as "a carefully crafted piece of legislation" 15 which should be ap-
plied according to its text. In interpreting this "carefully crafted
piece of legislation," the Supreme Court, in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, recently set out the limits of what courts may do:16
We have emphasized in the recent past that "[o]ur individual ap-
praisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [legislative]
course .. . is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a
statute. . . ." Our task, rather, is the narrow one of determining
what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute; once
that is done our powers are exhausted.
As stated by Justice Frankfurter:' 7
A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to con-
tract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy mak-
ing might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation
and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. He
must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal
contradiction. . . [T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the
line between adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition
of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained,
reluctance to do so.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have had Jus-
tice Frankfurter's admonition in mind when stating in Schacht v.
Brown:18
If Congress wishes to avoid the inclusion under RICO's umbrella
of "garden variety" fraud claims involving the operations of en-
terprises through mail and securities fraud, it may easily do so
through removing mail and securities fraud from the list of pred-
icate acts enumerated in § 1961. That is not, however, a pro-
gram which may be undertaken by this court. [Citation to United
States v. Turkette].
Many decisions which disregard these rules of statutory construc-
tion, and the plain language of the RICO statute, have engrafted
onto RICO the courts' own notions of what Congress should have
written or must have meant based upon personal attitudes toward
application of RICO to business frauds. 19
15. 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
16. 447 U.s. 303, 318 (1980).
17. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Pendency of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 533, 535 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter].
18. 711 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648), where the court
referred to applications of RICO to business frauds engaged in by well known busi-
nesses as "outrageous." In Hokama, 566 F. Supp. at 643, the court referred to an
interpretation of the statute which would allow for such applications as "implausible";
and in Harper v. New Japan Securities Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-1008 (C.D.
[Vol. 21
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D. Drafting a "Speaking" Complaint
In pleading business fraud under RICO it must be remembered
that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with par-
ticularity." Therefore, attention must be given to as much of the
detail as your client, the records which are available to you, and any
other sources of information at hand, can provide.
However, Rule 9(b) should provide no haven for defendants, as
this Rule is to be read in conjunction with Rule 8 which requires
only that there be a short and plain statement showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief.20 Moreover, as stated in Seville Indus-
trial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole were developed at least in part
to establish liberal rules of "notice" pleading.2 1
Cal. 1982), the court's personal attitude was that application of RICO to securities
fraud was "simply incomprehensible."
In discussing his respect for the approach of Mr. Justice Holmes to matters involving
construction of statutes, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
[T]he proof of the pudding is that his private feelings did not lead him to
invoke the rule of indefiniteness to invalidate legislation of which he strongly
disapproved...
Frankfurter, supra note 17, at 531.
20. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974).
21. 742 F.2d. 786, (3d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3499 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1984) (No. 84-879).
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to eliminate the vagaries
of technical pleading that once plagued complainants, and to replace them
with the considerably more liberal requirements of so-called "notice" plead-
ing. Under the modem rules, it is enough that a complaint puts the defendant
on notice of the claims against him. It is the function of discovery to fill in the
details, and of trial to establish fully each element of the cause of action. See 5
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1215
(1969). Id., at 790.
See Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,190 (C.D. Cal. 1984) where the court concluded by stating:
Given the unsettled state of the law, the expansive language of the statute, and
the legislative history indicating that the statute should be interpreted broadly,
the Court finds that it is improper to dismiss the RICO claim under Rule
12(b) (6). The issue of whether plaintiff has a right to recover under RICO
will be more properly decided on a motion for summary judgment or after
trial. At such a time the underlying facts of the case will be better developed
and the question of RICO's applicability can be more fully considered.
Id. at 97,714.
See also Northern Kentucky Bank Trust v. Rhein, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rptr. (CCH) 91,864 (E.D. Ky. 1984) where the court stated:
While all the pleadings in this case may have been more artfully drawn, the
Court is convinced that the particulars of fraud in this case could not have
been more specifically pleaded without resorting to specific fact pleading.
Here again, the Court is cognizant that the RICO claims asserted herein are
relatively new to the Courts, certainly to this Court. As long as the particu-
lars of the fraud have been pleaded such that the defendants are aware of the
circumstances and can respond, the Court is not inclined to dismiss on this
ground. In any event, the clarity of the claims alleged by the Bank have al-
8
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All things considered, a thorough factual workup and a thought-
ful complaint drafted to the facts as they apply separately to each
element of RICO should assist in alleviating court derived difficul-
ties in pursuing a RICO claim.
III. PLEADING PARTICULAR RICO ELEMENTS
A. Injury to Business or Property
In an effort to limit access to the courts for claims under RICO,
some courts speak of the RICO injury requirement as a rule of
"standing" through which they engraft onto RICO elements not
found in the statute.2 2
The language of section 1964(c), however, is clearly a standing
rule in itself. It states who "may sue," and contains no limitations
beyond "any person" "injured in his business or property" "by rea-
son of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter. ' 23 The language
of RICO sets its own standard for the injury which must be pled by
requiring a "pattern of racketeering activity." This pattern involves
a defendant who did not just engage in an isolated wrong, but rather
in repetitive intentional wrongs. Courts which attempt to read into
RICO additional "standing" requirements run afoul of the statu-
tory construction rules discussed above.24
Under section 1964(c) the "person" who may sue need not have
suffered any injury other than to his "business or property" as a
result of the wrongful conduct. This requirement is stated in clearly
disjunctive language, giving injury to property equal stature with
injury to business. In the hypothetical presented earlier, the client
lost "property" in the form of his investment assets through com-
mission and mark-up charges, losses on securities purchased upon
false statements of inside information, and additional losses as
might be determined upon further analysis. Attempts by defend-
ants to require a "racketeering enterprise injury" or "commercial
injury" involve amending out of the statute an otherwise actionable
injury to a person's "property." 25
ready grown, and undoubtedly will continue to grow, less blurred as the discov-
ery process continues.
Id. at 90,296-90,297 [emphasis added].
22. See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007-1008; Johnsen
v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1982); and Landmark Savings & Loan v.
Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
25. As stated by Judge Duffy in Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (A brokerage churning-misrepresentation
case):
[A]n examination of the statute's [RICO's] language reveals no basis for the
"racketeering injury" requirement. Part (b) [sic], for instance, of section 1962,
[Vol. 21
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In regard to our hypothetical client, pleading only the injury to
property, 26 identifying the injured property as the plaintiffs invest-
ment assets, and summarizing the sources of that injury, including
the drain of the client's investment assets into the defendant's pock-
ets, may assist in overcoming recent efforts of defendants and courts
to focus on the injury requirement as an area in which to engraft
new elements onto RICO.
27
B. By Reason of a Violation of Section 1962
Some courts consider RICO as being aimed solely "at curtailing
the infiltration of business enterprises by organized crime," and
therefore require some allegation of infiltration and/or control of an
enterprise by racketeering activity or infusion of racketeering in-
come into an enterprise.28 However, section 1962 identifies "Pro-
hibited activities" in three separate and distinct subsections, each of
which independently identifies a type of prohibited activity without
reference to, or reliance upon, the other subsections. 29 Section
1962(c), which applies to our hypothetical client outlined above,
states only that: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to con-
duct [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." Sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) make unlawful the infiltration
and infusion of capital and the control to which these courts refer.
3 0
simply makes it unlawful to conduct the affairs of an enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering injury. A brokerage
enterprise infiltrated by organized crime and engaged in defrauding its cus-
tomers through acts like those alleged here might injure no one but the cus-
tomers of the enterprise. There would be no injury above and beyond that
caused by the predicate acts of fraud forming the "pattern of racketeering
activity." Such conduct, however, would violate RICO and would lie near the
center of Congress' concern. In addition, § 1964(c) simply provides that "any
person ... injured by reason of a violation of section 1962" may invoke
RICO's civil remedies. I can imagine no construction of those words which
would exclude from their coverage the primary victims of such a scheme and
which would render such defendants immune from civil sanctions.
26. Wherever RICO identifies an element in the disjunctive, pleading only that
alternative element which counsel feels reasonably confident is applicable on the facts
should aid in avoiding the common error found in RICO decisions requiring all of what
are in fact alternative elements. Therefore, injury to business should only be pled where
the facts warrant such a claim, as against injury to non-business property only.
27. See, "Court Developed Roadblocks to Actions Under RICO-A Disfavored
Law", infra notes 46-100 and accompanying text.
28. Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1004. See also Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. at 285;
and Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-
1137 (D. Mass. 1982). In Landmark Say. & Loan, 527 F. Supp. at 208-209, the court
used the "infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering activity into the enterprise"
as its example of when a " 'racketeering enterprise injury' might occur." See "Imposing
an 'Injury of a Type RICO Was Intended to Prevent' Test," infra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text.
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
30. Id.
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss2/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
To require the client to plead "infiltration," "infusion" of racke-
teering income, or "control," would be to absorb section 1962(c)
into sections 1962(a) and 1962(b), or in effect, to amend out an ex-
plicit provision of the RICO statute. As section 1962(c) stands on
its own, and contains no direct or indirect reference to infiltration,
infusion or control, by properly pleading only the prohibited activi-
ties identified in section 1962(c) the client need not plead any infil-
tration, infusion, or control. He merely needs to plead injury from
the "conduct" of the "affairs" of an "enterprise" "through a pattern
of racketeering activity. '31
After holding that "a civil RICO plaintiff need not allege injury
beyond any injury to business or property resulting from the under-
lying acts of racketeering," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
went on to state in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank and
Trust Company of Chicago:32
This holding by no means renders superfluous the requirement in
section 1964(c) that the plaintiff be injured by "reason of' a vio-
lation of section 1962. As we read this "by reason of" language,
it simply imposes a proximate cause requirement on plaintiffs.
The criminal conduct in violation of section 1962 must, directly
or indirectly, have injured the plaintiff's business or property.
C. The "Enterprise"
The prohibited activities identified by section 1962(c), under
which our hypothetical client will proceed, are those activities
which are engaged in as part of the conduct of "any" enterprise.
The word "enterprise" is defined in section 1961(4) of RICO as fol-
lows: "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."'33
The language of the statute includes, expansively, each identified
type of person, entity or grouping within the common usage of the
word "enterprise." Therefore, "include," in the context of the defi-
nition of "enterprise" makes that definition an illustrative, not ex-
haustive, definition. 34 As such, we must go to the dictionary to
define the common usage within which illustrations of the word
"enterprise" fall. For example:
31. See discussion in Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 653-
54 (7th Cir. 1984). See also O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 91,509 at 98,561 (D. Ariz. 1984).
32. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1985) (No. 84-822).
33. 18 U.S.C § 1961(4) (1982) [emphasis added].
34. United States v. Haber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980).
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1. A design of which the execution is attempted; a piece of
work taken in hand, an undertaking; chiefly, any now exclu-
sively, a bold, arduous, or momentous undertaking. 2. Disposi-
tion or readiness to engage in undertakings of difficulty, risk, or
danger; daring spirit. 3. The action of taking in hand; manage-
ment, superintendence. 35
The definition of "enterprise" also includes "1. An undertaking es-
pecially one of some scope, complication, and risk. .. 2. A busi-
ness. 3. Industrious effort, especially when directed toward making
money"; 36 "a plan or design for a venture or undertaking . . ."
"any systematic purposeful activity or type of activity"; 37 and "an
undertaking an Affair, Business or Concern, an Attempt or
Design."3 8
The particular "undertaking," "systematic purposeful activity,"
or "piece of work taken in hand" involved in our hypothetical bro-
kerage situation is the enterprise of providing broker-dealer and in-
vestment advisory services to customers, including our hypothetical
client.39
As stated in Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co. :40
A RICO enterprise exists apart from the pattern of racketeer-
ing in which it engages; it is a separate element of a RICO claim.
[Citation to United States v. Turkette]. . . .There is a dispute in
the circuits as to just how distinct the enterprise and pattern of
racketeering must be. .... 41
The court need not resolve this conflict in the instant case be-
cause the complaint can be construed to allege that the enterprise
had a discrete existence from the alleged racketeering acts.
35. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971).
36. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1969).
37. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971). See also
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1940).
38. A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1737).
39. The "enterprise" in United States v. Turkette similarly identified a particular
"undertaking," "systematic purposeful activity," and "piece of work taken in hand."
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579. See also Northern Kentucky Bank & Trust,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) at 90,296, where the court
stated:
F.R.CIv.P. 9(b)'s particularity requirements, moreover, do not apply in this
Court's mind to the pleading of the Structure of an "enterprise" in the RICO
context. F.R.CIv.P. 9(b) by its own terms is limited to the "circumstances
constituting the fraud" and does not therefore require the plaintiff to particu-
larly allege the nature or structure of the RICO "enterprise."
40. Jensen, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) at 97,713-97,714.
41. The court compared Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (1983), aff'd en
banc, (1983), where the Eighth Circuit Court required that evidence proving the exist-
ence of a pattern and proving the enterprise be distinct, with Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
719 F.2d 5, 22-23 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984), where the Second Circuit
Court stated that the enterprise need be no more than the sum of the predicate racke-
teering acts. See discussion of Rae v. Union Bank, supra note 7.
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The Complaint alleges that Hutton and Fuhrer were engaged
in the enterprise of "providing broker-dealer and investment ad-
visory services and managing investments." This "association in
fact" is related to the pattern of racketeering alleged (the alleged
acts of fraud occurred in the course of providing such services).
It can also be inferred that the enterprise also engaged in distinct
acts of providing legitimate services to investors. Therefore,
plaintiff has pleaded the elements of an enterprise required by the
statute.
D. The Broker as a Person Associated With the Enterprise
As the securities brokerage firm in our hypothetical is an "entity
capable of holding legal or beneficial interest in property," it is a
"person" capable of conducting the affairs of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity against which relief may be
sought.4 2 Aside from other injury to the client's property, this "per-
son" obtained, for itself, property directly from the accounts of its
customer in the form of commissions and mark-up income through
the pattern of activity described above.43
E. Pattern of Racketeering Activity-Criminal Conduct
Pleading the pattern of racketeering activity with specificity in a
business fraud case should involve an effort (a) to characterize each
fraudulent scheme factually, and identify the particular racketeer-
ing activity in section 1961(1) which is being pursued, (b) to plead
the various fraudulent schemes in separate paragraphs and show
their interrelationship, 44 (c) to separately plead the criminal intent
standard by which the mail and wire frauds charges are "indicta-
ble" and the securities frauds offenses are "punishable", 45 and (d) to
plead the RICO claim only against those particular defendants who
may satisfy this criminal intent standard regarding the pattern of
conduct charged.
IV. COURT DEVELOPED ROADBLOCKS TO ACTIONS UNDER
RICO-A DISFAVORED LAW
Many courts have derived roadblocks to civil RICO actions in-
volving business fraud which are as varied as the imaginations of
defense counsel who attack RICO claims, and of judges who seem
42. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) & 1962(c) (1982).
43. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
44. "The term 'pattern' itself requires the showing of a relationship .... 116
CONG. REc. 18940 (1970) (comments of Sen. McClellan).
45. Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x; Section 32 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77ff. See O'Brien, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 98,562.
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to find new elements to engraft onto RICO almost as fast as prior
derived elements are discredited. 46 Therefore, in advising a client,
counsel should consider (1) which of these engrafted elements have
substance upon which other courts may tend to rely, (2) which are
merely straws which should fall upon proper analysis, and (3)
which may be satisfied upon detailed pleading of the particular facts
of the case at hand
The discussion above regarding the Supreme Court's characteri-
zation of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 as "a carefully
crafted piece of legislation" to be applied according to its text, and
the rules of construction as applied to such a law,47 should be kept
in mind as this Article discusses some of the more notable court
derived "roadblocks" to civil RICO actions.
A. Rationale Used by Courts to Derive Roadblocks to Civil RICO
Claims
1. Interpreting RICO as an Ambiguous Law.-Despite the Con-
gressional mandate written into the preamble of RICO48 that "the
provisions of. . .[RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes," many courts refer to RICO as an "ambigu-
ous" law. These courts use this label to construe RICO strictly by
writing unstated elements into the law in an effort to limit access to
the courts for RICO claimants. 49
In light of the varied, and sometimes seemingly contrived, rulings
by some courts which deprive plaintiffs of forums in which to pur-
sue substantial business frauds appearing to be within the RICO
purview, 50 it may be more appropriate to refer to RICO as a "disfa-
vored" law. This is so particularly as applied to white collar busi-
ness persons who attempt to drape themselves in the gown of
legitimacy, but who are nonetheless willing to engage in fraudulent
46. In commenting on the recent Second Circuit decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) requiring a "racketeering enterprise in-
jury," the Seventh Circuit looked closely at the language of the Sedima decision focus-
ing on organized crime, Sedima's dismay at RICO's application to so-called "respected
and legitimate" businesses as a basis of saying that the law is "ambiguous," and
Sedima's numerous references to "mobsters," and concluded that: "On the basis of
these statements, it appears that Sedima has revived the discredited 'organized crime
nexus' requirement without quite saying so. Cf Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany
Industries, 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984)." Haroco, 747 F.2d at 394. See also In re
Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1430-37.
47. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
48. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947.
49. Sedinza, 741 F.2d at 486, 488, 500.
50. See discussion of facts and the dissent in Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741
F.2d 511, 512-515, 518 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S.
Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-657).
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conduct for which they may be held criminally accountable under
the laws of the United States.
2. Labeling Business Fraud as "Garden Variety Fraud".-The
decisions dismissing business fraud-RICO claims on the ground
that they involve only "garden variety fraud," can, in general, be
viewed as an attempt to raise technical issues while seeking to re-
draft RICO to insulate businessmen from the reach of RICO re-
gardless of their conduct. By doing this, courts rendering these
decisions disregard the means by which Congress stated it would go
about the "eradication of organized crime," particularly the "pro-
viding [of] new remedies" to deal with the type of conduct Congress
determined was being engaged in by members of organized crime. 5'
The section 1961(1) definition of "racketeering activity," and the
remedies found in section 1964(c), carry out that purpose by stat-
ing, in effect, that if you engage in the type of conduct engaged in by
organized crime as defined by Congress in sections 1961(1) and
1962, you are subject to RICO liability no matter who you are. As
was stated in United States v. Carter:52
The fact that the alleged perpetrators are presumably respectable
and entrusted with responsibility . . . by stockholders does not
suggest .. . that they are incapable of engaging in organized
criminal activity. We all stand equal before the bar of criminal
justice, and the wearing of a white collar, even though it is
starched, does not preclude the organized pursuit of unlawful
profit.
Moreover, as stated in Sutliff v. Donovan Companies, Inc. 53
Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more
concerned to avoid opening loopholes through which the min-
ions of organized crime might crawl to freedom than to avoid
making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble damage
proceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes.
Those courts which have raised their voices in abhorrence over
the thought of a plaintiff pursuing enhanced remedies under RICO
for "garden variety fraud" provide no standards upon which to de-
51. Blakey, Reflections, supra note 6; wherein there is a discussion of objections of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and of the ACLU to the breadth of
S. 30 as of May, 1970, which then included fraud within the list of predicate acts, and
the acknowledgment during hearings in the House and in statements by Sen. McClellan
that the bill was not limited to organized crime figures, but rather dealt with conduct
which was characteristic of organized crime, whomever might engage in that conduct.
Id. at 272-73 and nn.lI1-112.
52. 493 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. deniedsub nom., Mathews v. United States, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-304 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Blakey, Reflections, supra note 6, at 261, 271, 275-76 n.75,
n.78 and accompanying text, n.87, and n. 112 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 31, at 654.
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termine what falls within their personal view of non-actionable, gar-
den variety fraud, as opposed to actionable fraud which is explicitly
included in section 1961(l)(B) and (D) of RICO.5 4
Congress left no such ambiguity. For mail fraud and wire fraud
the conduct must be "indictable"; that is, satisfy all elements of the
mail and wire fraud statutes, including intentional conduct. For se-
curities fraud the conduct must be "punishable" under the federal
securities laws; thus, requiring willful conduct.55
B. Specific Roadblocks Derived by the Courts
1. Refusing to Allow RICO Where Other Remedies Exist for the
Predicate Acts Charged.-RICO claims have been dismissed by a
number of courts citing the following language from Harper v. New
Japan Securities International, Inc. :56
[T]here is no evidence that [RICO] was meant to preempt or
supplement the remedies already provided by those statutes
which define a predicate RICO offense.
While there is no pre-emption, RICO clearly supplements other
laws. A review of the acts listed as "racketeering activity" in sec-
tion 1961(1) reflects a number of predicate acts which are civilly
actionable under federal, state and/or common law. In fact, RICO
was designed at least in part to deal with the prior ineffectiveness of
other laws in rooting out onerous patterns of conduct;57 thus evi-
dencing Congress' knowledge that other remedies existed for at
least some of the predicate acts.
Moreover, the existence of other civil remedies no more preempts
the availability of a RICO remedy than a remedy for false state-
ments in a securities registration statement under Section 11 of the
Securities Act preempts a remedy under Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, which was discussed by the Supreme Court in
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston.5 8 Rather, the cumulative con-
struction of remedies under the securities laws and RICO furthers
the broad remedial purposes of both laws.5 9 In fact, Securities Ex-
change Act section 28(a) explicitly provides that: "The rights and
remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." 6
54. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976).
56. See supra note 19, at 1008.
57. See supra note 8. See also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586; and Blakey, Reflections,
supra note 6 at 266.
58. 103 S. Ct. 683, 687-90 (1983). See also Blakey, Reflections, supra note 6, at
n.92.
59. See discussion, 103 S. Ct. at 689-90.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
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This provision existed in 1970 when RICO was enacted, and was
retained during amendments to the Securities Exchange Act
adopted in 1975 and 1982 when RICO provided its own remedy in
the event of a pattern of conduct punishable as fraud in the sale of
securities.61 "These provisions confirm that the remedies in each
Act were to be supplemented by 'any and all' additional
remedies." '62
The RICO claim which might be pursued on behalf of our hypo-
thetical client would seek remedies under a statute addressing a pat-
tern of conduct, which is not addressed in the Securities Exchange
Act or the Securities Act. Further, as in Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, while different recovery is provided for under RICO
than under the Securities Exchange Act, different elements must be
proven, including (1) a pattern of activity, and (2) intent.63
The approach of those courts following Harper also disregards
the fact that no civil remedies exist for mail or wire fraud. 64 More-
over, a civil remedy for fraud under Section 17 of the Securities Act
of 1933 was only recognized by the Ninth Circuit after RICO reme-
dies existed and has yet to be recognized elsewhere. 65
2. Requiring a Nexus to Organized Crime.-Although defend-
ants continue to argue that there is a nexus to organized crime re-
quirement, and some trial courts continue to require such a nexus, 66
RICO was drafted in the constitutional mold of statutes that deal
with conduct, rather than with status. Therefore, adding an "or-
ganized crime" or "racketeering" element to RICO by requiring the
pleading of a "racketeering enterprise" or a "racketeering injury"
element, adds unstated language to the text contrary to the rules of
construction in a manner which raises constitutional questions Con-
gress purposefully attempted to avoid.67
61. See also Securities Act, Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982).
62. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct. at 688.
63. See, supra note 58. See also supra notes 44, 45 and accompanying text regard-
ing the pleading of "indictable" acts and acts involving offenses "punishable" under the
federal securities laws. Compare the Securities Exchange Act, which requires only one
misrepresentation for a civilly actionable violation, and where recklessness satisfies the
scienter requirement of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Mihara, 619
F.2d at 821.
64. Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford, and Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634,
636 (5th Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 507 F.2d 723, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); Op-
penheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d, 516, 518-19 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011
(1967).
65. Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (1981). Contra,
Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1977) cert. denied
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
66. Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) q 91,661 (D. Mass. 1984).
67. See Blakey, Reflections, supra note 6, at 276-79.
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In Schacht v. Brown, a case representing the majority rule on this
issue, the court provided a compilation of cases to support its state-
ment that "most courts" which have considered this issue have con-
cluded that RICO is not restricted to members of organized crime,
and applies as well to "otherwise 'legitimate' business people."' 68
3. Applying the "But-For" Test.-In their zeal to thwart the
granting of RICO relief in business fraud cases, some courts have
established a test whereby a plaintiff must show that he would not
have suffered injury "but-for" a pattern of racketeering conduct be-
yond the predicate acts.
A primary statement of what this "but-for" test is, and how it is
supposed to be met, can be found in Bankers Trust Company v.
Rhoades.69 This case involves such a pervasive business fraud that
the majority made note of the trial court's findings "that 'based
solely upon the language of the statute, one could hardly contend
that [Bankers] has not adequately alleged a violation of
§ 1962. . . ,'"7 and Judge Cardamone in dissent exclaimed, "If
civil RICO does not provide a remedy on the facts of this totally
outrageous case, it never will."'71
In moving from agreement with the trial court that a violation of
section 1962 had been pled, to the conclusion that no actionable
RICO injuries had been suffered, the court erroneously concluded
that:72
[T]here is a violation of section 1962 only if there are present
both (1) the pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) the use of
that pattern to invest in, control, or conduct, a RICO
enterprise ...
The import of this analysis is that if a complaint alleges a pro-
prietary injury that is caused by the defendant's predicate acts,
rather than by its use of a pattern of racketeering activity in con-
nection with a RICO enterprise, the injury cannot be said to have
been caused by "a violation of section 1962."
The error of this analysis is that section 1962 involves acquisition
of an interest in "any enterprise" with proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering activity, 73 acquisition or maintenance of an interest in
68. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1356. See also Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1063; Campanale, 518
F.2d at 363-64; Moss, 719 F.2d at 21; United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328
n.10 (9th Cir. 1981); Jensen, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rptr. (CCH) at 97,713;
and Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 512-15,
518.
70. Id. at 515.
71. Id. at 518.
72. Id. at 516.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982); see supra note 9 [emphasis added].
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"any enterprise, '74 conduct of the affairs of "any enterprise"
through a pattern of racketeering activity,75 or conspiracy to do any
of the above.76 Therefore, the effort in Bankers Trust to support a
court developed requirement of some showing of injury beyond that
to a person's business or property, from a pattern of racketeering
activity charged involves an attempted resurrection of the discred-
ited "racketeer"-"organized crime" element under a new guise.77
Despite the erroneous underlying basis of the court's analysis, the
Bankers Trust court, unlike other courts which require some injury
beyond that resulting directly from the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity with no statement of what that something more consists of,
attempted to give litigants some direction. In doing so, the court
stated:
Bankers argues that it is conceptually impossible to make any
distinction between injury flowing from the predicate acts and
injury flowing from a pattern of racketeering activity, because a
plaintiff injured by the predicate acts is ipsofacto injured by the
pattern. We disagree. If a plaintiff's injury is that caused by the
predicate acts themselves, he is injured regardless of whether or
not there is a pattern; hence he cannot be said to be injured by
the pattern, and the pattern cannot be said to be the but-for cause
of the injury. Further, we can envision a number of circum-
stances in which injury could be attributable to a pattern but not
to the individual predicated acts. For example, a plaintiff who is
victimized by a defendant enterprise's multiple acts of arson may
thereafter be denied fire insurance as a result of his fire history;
such a plaintiff whose property subsequently suffers innocent fire
damage would be unable to obtain reimbursement for the dam-
age, and his monetary loss would be the result of the pattern of
predicate acts of the enterprise, rather than any of the individual
acts. . . . [T]he plaintiff would have suffered an injury to his
business or property by reason of the defendants' use of a RICO
enterprise and a pattern of racketeering acts; the individual rack-
eteering acts, however, could not be said to have caused the same
injury.78
One fallacy in this reasoning is that recovery under RICO still
depends upon causation; and under California and other state laws
the innocent fire could be recovered for in a simple property dam-
age case against the arsonist as a part of all the "detriment proxi-
mately caused" by the wrong, once the same causation proof is
made.79 Moreover, it is an emasculation of the purpose of "eradi-
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982); see supra note 9 [emphasis added].
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982); see supra note 9 [emphasis added].
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982); see supra note 9 [emphasis added].
77. See supra note 46. See also, supra notes 48-50, 66-68 and accompanying text.
78. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 517.
79. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.
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cating" wrongful conduct if the only plaintiffs who could use the
"new remedies [established] to deal with the unlawful activities"
identified in RICO are those who fortuitously suffer extra injury
beyond that injury caused by the particular wrongs identified in sec-
tion 1961(l). 0
While Bankers Trust, in setting forth the "but-for" rule, defined
one test of additional injury which might satisfy those courts adding
elements to RICO, one might then ask: What will satisfy this new
test? In the closing section of its opinion the court in Bankers Trust
again attempted to give some direction when it stated:
The fact that later actions by the defendants may have prevented
Bankers from remedying the injury caused it in 1976 does not
mean that Bankers was injured by the "pattern" of the bank-
ruptcy fraud and the later acts. Similarly, Banker's forced ex-
penditures of legal fees in connection with frivolous and
corruptly conducted lawsuits occurred as a result of the defend-
ants' distinct conduct in pursuing those lawsuits; Bankers ex-
penses would have been incurred regardless of any other
predicate acts performed by the defendants.8 1
Through this language the court appears to have stated that lull-
ing conduct, which itself may involve the predicate act of mail
fraud,82 will not suffice if all that is caused by the lulling is a preven-
tion or delay in pursuing remedies or additional legal expenses.
However, the direct inference is that the "but-for" test would be
satisfied if the lulling conduct resulted in new damages. One exam-
ple of this would be in the instance of a false accounting resulting in
our hypothetical brokerage customer continuing to utilize the serv-
ices of the broker to his further injury. Any additional injury would
not have occurred but-for the lulling conduct which contributed to
the continued relationship with the customer whereby the broker
could engage in additional predicate acts, and thereby continue to
drain our hypothetical client's investment assets through additional
commissions and mark-up income to the benefit of the broker.
Query, could our hypothetical client then pursue an action under
RICO for his injuries resulting from that racketeering activity
80. The key purpose of RICO's civil remedy is to "divest the association of
the fruits of its ill-gotten gains." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585
(1981). This purpose would be severely undermined if persons who suffered
direct harm from racketeering activity as defined by the statute could not re-
cover in the absence of a showing of some "special" harm .... Such a rule
would leave money derived from actions prohibited by RICO precisely where
Congress did not intend it to remain, in the hands of RICO violators.
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. at 49-50. See also the "causa-
tion" discussion in Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398.
81. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 518.
82. See United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1976); and United
States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 800 (5th Cir. 1975).
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which occurred after the lulling conduct only? Since the "racke-
teering injury" element is being used by courts as a standing re-
quirement only, there is no reason for such a limitation. Once a
plaintiff has standing there should be no impediment to his ability
to proceed to recover for all damages suffered by conduct which
falls within the statute. We are again left, however, with a strictly
fortuitous result as to which injured persons may proceed, and for
which injuries. The fortuitous nature of this result would seem to
conflict with the certainty needed for prospective defendants to
know that if they engage in conduct proscribed by Congress they
are liable to suit, with enhanced damages geared to eradicating that
conduct.
In pleading a Civil RICO claim, so long as some courts apply this
"but-for" test, it will remain important for counsel to review the
facts of each business fraud closely to determine whether at least a
portion of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff followed some lulling
conduct, or whether the injuries can otherwise be construed as inju-
ries which would not have occurred but-for a pattern of conduct,
and to clearly plead that construction of the facts. 83
4. Imposing an "Injury of a Type RICO was Intended to Pre-
vent" Test.-A number of other courts, including the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company,
Inc.,84 have engrafted an element onto the civil remedies provision
which would require damages from only the kinds of wrongs with
which those courts think RICO was meant to deal. The fallacy in
this reasoning is that, having no factual base of reference, these
courts simply apply their own unstudied policy decisions contrary
to the Supreme Court's dictates in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.85
Moreover, while business fraud is conveniently excluded from the
reasoning these courts apply, they do not state what they would
then include under "mail," "wire," and "securities" fraud. 86
These courts conveniently disregard references in the legislative
history to Congress' concern for losses suffered by investors.87 As
83. See Alexander Grant & Co., 742 F.2d at 413, where the Eighth Circuit Court
stated that:
Grant's complaint does not simply allege injury from the underlying predicate
acts. It contends that Tiffany was conducted through a pattern of mail and
wire fraud that enabled it to remain in business. As a result of this extended
life, Grant continued to provide its accounting services to Tiffany for a time
greater than it would have had the fraud not occurred. This also increased the
harm resulting to Grant's business reputation. We conclude that these allega-
tions sufficiently plead an injury "by reason of" a RICO violation.
84. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501. See also Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007.
85. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982), supra note 8 and accompanying text.
87. As stated in Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.:
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exemplified in a study of continuous securities violators engaging in
patterns of unlawful conduct,8 8 Congress might very well have
meant to deal with such securities violators through RICO. Fur-
thermore, under the language of RICO there is no way to distin-
guish between the brokerage people described in that study and
brokerage defendants in RICO actions so long as those defendants
are willing to engage in conduct which Congress proscribed under
the statute, particularly a pattern of mail, wire and securities fraud
with willful intent such that they are indictable and punishable for
their conduct.
5. Requiring a Prior Conviction.-On July 25, 1984, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Sedima case enunciated a require-
ment that a defendant be convicted before a civil RICO action
would lie against him.89
However, applying the rules of statutory construction discussed
above, section 1964(c) unambiguously provides that:90 "[A]ny per-
son injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor. . . ." As applied to
our hypothetical client, section 1962(c) provides that "It shall be
unlawful for any person. . . to conduct or participate, . . . in the
conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity. . . ." The definition of "pattern of racketeering activity"
requires "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within ten years
of each other.91 The definition of "racketeering activity" as applied
to our hypothetical client, includes any mail or wire fraud which is
"indictable" and any fraud in the sale of securities which is an of-
fense "punishable" under the federal securities laws.92
We then consider what constitutes "indictable" acts or "punish-
able" securities law offenses. Under the doctrine stated by the
Supreme Court in Russello v. United States, these words must be
defined according to their "ordinary meaning. ' 93 The starting
[T]he legislative history indicates that harm to individual legitimate businesses
such as the plaintiffs' alleged investment losses. . . was a congressional con-
cern. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Sec. 904(a),
84 Stat. 922, 947.
Crocker National Bank, 555 F. Supp. at 49. See also Blakey, Reflections, supra note 6,
at n.48; and Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 which states: "The Congress finds that
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Na-
tion's economic system, [and] harm innocent investors .
88. See Appendix A.
89. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-504.
90. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982), see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) & (D) (1982), see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
93. 104 S. Ct. 296, 299 (1983). The rule of statutory construction is that:
"[A]bsent clear evidence of contrary legislative intention, a statute must be interpreted
1985]
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place is the dictionary.94
The suffix "-able, -ible" is defined as "Susceptible, capable, or
worthy of,. . . for example, debatable, eatable, adducible, collapsi-
ble. . .95 and "capable of or worthy of (being acted upon)" 96.
If Congress had wanted to require a civil defendant charged with
mail or wire fraud to first be "indicted," let alone "convicted," or a
civil defendant charged with fraud in the sale of securities to first be
"convicted" or "punished," section 1961(1) itself indicates that
Congress knew how to state what it wanted.97 Congress explicitly
used different modifying words in section 1961(1) to apply to differ-
ent types of activity;98 and when Congress did intend to require a
according to its plain language." United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory language as follows:
As for the language "any act which is indictable" (or "chargeable"), conceiva-
bly Congress meant by the choice of these words to suggest either that indict-
ments or, in the case of state felonies, informations are not required, since the
acts need only be "indictable" or "chargeable" (emphasis added). But a plau-
sible alternative view of the words "indictable" and "chargeable" found in
RICO's definitional section, is that Congress did not intend to give civil courts
power to determine whether an action is "indictable" in the absence of a prop-
erly returned indictment or "chargeable" absent an information.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499-500.
However, "a plausible alternative" is not clear evidence of a Congressional intent to
give these words meaning outside of the plain language used. This is all the more clear
as the Court gives no indication that this "plausible alternative" derives from anything
stated by Congress or even from dictionaries. On what basis is this purported "alterna-
tive" plausible other than in the mind's eye of the court? See the discussion of Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
94. Russell, 104 S. Ct. at 299.
95. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1969).
96. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971); see also WEB-
STER'S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1940); and WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983). THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971) refers to the suffix "-able" as a special form of the word
"able," the definition of which includes "2. suitable, fit, appropriate; suited, adapted,
fitted." A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1737) defines "able" as "Suf-
ficient, or capable to do a particular Act or Thing."
97. Nowhere does the history of RICO indicate that a RICO victim's ability
to assert rights created by the statute should rest at the mercy of the local
prosecutor's office. A prosecutor may for good reason choose on occasion not
to prosecute RICO violators, but the legislative history does not suggest that
the private victims of the violator should forego remedy because a prosecutor
has decided not to press charges. Neither does the legislative history show
that the private victims of RICO violators should lose their RICO rights just
because a prosecutor has lost his RICO case. As I see it, the legislative history
shows just the opposite. ...
Grado v. Gross, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) % 91,660, at
99,336 (D. Mass. 1984).
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1982) (acts which are "chargeable under state law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year"); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (acts
which are "indictable" under any of the following provisions of Title 18, United States
Code," including mail and wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C) (acts which are "indicta-
ble" under Title 29, United States Code); and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) ("any offense
23
Bertz: Pursuing a Business Fraud RICO Claim
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
1985] PURSUING A BUSINESS FRAUD RICO CLAIM 269
conviction as a part of the legislative scheme of the Organized
Crime Control Act, of which RICO is a part, it simply said so.99
Nowhere does the word "convicted," however, appear in sections
1961, 1962 or 1964(c) under which counsel may proceed on behalf
of our hypothetical client.
This element, engrafted onto the statute by the Second Circuit,
has been rejected by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.1°°
V. ETHICAL/PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PURSUING A
RICO CLAIM
Some attorneys justify pursuing all claims, defenses, contentions
and motions possible upon the rationalization that they have an eth-
ical obligation to pursue every possible course of action on behalf of
their clients. However, the courses of action to be taken upon con-
sultation with the client which will best serve the client's interests
may be those which are tempered by considerations regarding good
faith pleadings and a cost/benefit analysis. With regard to civil
RICO pleadings, these considerations include (1) the substantiality
of the fraud and of the intent of the defendant as discussed above;
(2) potential negative effects a charge of "racketeer" may have upon
settlement possibilities in a particular case, especially where certain
defendants may bristle at such a label with the effect of severing
lines of communication; and (3) the cost of aggressively pursuing a
RICO claim, which is extensive in light of the unsettled nature of
this area of the law.
Consideration should particularly be given to Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in his individual name .... The signature of an attorney...
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
involving ... fraud in the sale of securities ... [and other conduct], punishable under
any law of the United States." As an even clearer indicator of Congress' intention to be
explicit as to what modifiers would apply to which types of "racketeering activity,"
consider the following language found in section 1961(B) listing acts which are "racke-
teering activity" if they are "indictable": "section 659 (relating to theft from interstate
shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is feloneous .. " (Emphasis added).
No other predicate act contains limiting language of this type.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575,(e),(g), 3576 and 3577. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1863(c)
which provides that: "Upon conviction of a person under this section [dealing with
RICO criminal penalties], the court shall authorize . . .seizures and forfeitures of
property." (Emphasis added).
100. See USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.2 (6th Cir.
1982); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1286-87
(7th Cir. 1983); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 393 n.12.
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grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee."' 0 1
In the matter of Financial Federation, Inc. v. Ashkenazy,10 2 a fi-
nancial institution brought suit against shareholders in anticipation
of a shareholder's suit for breach of fiduciary duty, charging the
shareholders with RICO and other securities law violations. Upon
findings of no proof to support the RICO claim, the court held pur-
suant to Rule 11 that: 0 3 "Ashkenazy and AEI are entitled to re-
cover attorney's fees from FFI by virtue of its bad faith in
commencing and maintaining an improper RICO claim against
them without reasonable basis for belief that its allegations could be
established." Of the total award of $500,000.00 for attorney's fees,
$150,000.00 applied explicitly "with respect to the RICO claim,"
while the balance applied with respect to the bad faith of Financial
Federation, Inc. in bringing other claims against the shareholders.
Counsel considering commencing civil RICO claims would do
well to keep in mind that if current appeals challenging court de-
rived RICO elements'0 4 are successful, courts may be more inclined
to turn to Rule 11 to discourage improper cases from being brought
under RICO.
While historically Rule 11 was not effective in deterring abuse,
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building
upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court
to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. As amended effective August 1, 1983. See also Section
1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code which states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
102. [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,489 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
103. Id. at 98,441.
104. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (Oct. 24, 1984) (No.
84-657); and Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, -
U.S.L.W. - (U.S. 1984) (No. 84-604).
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opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation.
[Citations omitted] Greater attention by the district courts to
pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions
when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics
and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivo-
lous claims or defenses. 10 5
Furthermore,
The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that
efforts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that the
rule will be applied when properly invoked. The words "sanc-
tions" in the caption, for example, stresses a deterrent orientation
in dealing with improper pleadings, motions or other papers.
• . . And the words "shall impose" in the last sentence focus the
court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for pleading
and motion abuses. 10 6
Moreover,
The amended rule should eliminate any doubt as to the propriety
of assessing sanctions against the attorney.
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the
rule, it may be appropriate under the circumstances of the [par-
ticular] case to impose a sanction on the client. 10 7
The question then becomes how to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 11 in bringing a RICO claim. In this regard:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty
imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances. 10 8
However, with regard to the potential negative effects this rule
could have on the bringing of a RICO claim where the conduct to
be charged falls within the statute:
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or crea-
tivity in pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected
to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the
signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at
the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted
[based upon reasonable inquiry by the signator]. 10 9
Note that if inquiry and analysis is made of those facts which are
available from the client and any other sources, and of the law as it
currently applies, prior to filing a RICO claim, and that analysis
supports a decision to pursue that claim, not only will Rule 11 have
been satisfied, but counsel will also have at hand the detail neces-
105. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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sary to draft a speaking complaint which will assist in overcoming
the court developed roadblocks to that RICO claim.
CONCLUSION
Just as private civil actions for damages are acknowledged to be
an important facet of enforcement of the securities laws, 110 private
civil actions under section 1964(c) are an important facet of en-
forcement of RICO in its purposes of eradicating racketeering from
the fibre of our society."' This effect follows whether those civil
actions are pursued directly against racketeers; are pursued against
those business people who are willing to engage in intentional fraud-
ulent conduct which racketeers will emulate if it is helpful to them
and condoned by the court; or are pursued against those business
people who racketeers seek to use because of their willingness to
engage in patterns of intentional fraudulent conduct. 112
However, counsel pursuing civil RICO actions must accept the
responsibility of exercising good judgment and a willingness to do a
thorough job, lest their conduct encourage the courts to overaggres-
sively apply Rule 11 to the personal detriment of the client as well
as counsel in dealing with disfavored applications of RICO to busi-
ness frauds.
110. See Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980).
111. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 585. See Sen. Hruska's statements in introducing a fore-
runner of what became RICO, supra note 6.
112. See Appendix A.
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APPENDIX A
Circuit Judge Oakes in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc.,
states that since Congress did not consider the breadth to which
RICO applies on its face the courts may consider what Congress
would have done had it considered RICO's application to business
frauds. He then proceeds to state his own unstudied conclusion
that Congress would not have included business fraud matters
within the ambit of RICO had Congress given this matter any
consideration. 1
Whatever problems this reasoning has as against rules of statu-
tory construction, and the fact that mail, wire and securities frauds
are explicitly included within the ambit of RICO, the record which
could be placed before Congress raises significant questions of
whether Judge Oakes' unstudied personal conclusions are correct.
Contrary to Judge Oakes' conclusion, there are numerous securi-
ties fraud violators who often associate together, who sometimes as-
sociate with persons considered to be members of organized crime,
and who will use brokerage and other professionals who are willing
to engage in fraudulent conduct.
The following is a report of a limited study of continuous securi-
ties violators.2 This report indicates that if Congress desires to ver-
ify whether there is a factual basis for inclusion of mail, wire and
securities frauds within RICO by requesting the appropriate federal
law enforcement agencies to catalog continuous securities, postal
and wire fraud perpetrators, there may very well be support for use
of RICO as a weapon against whomever engages in continuous vio-
lative conduct, even if Judge Oakes might find this use abhorrent
when otherwise "legitimate" businessmen are involved. 3
The results of this study are reported here in the form of summa-
ries from public documents relating principally to five individuals,
each of whom engaged in a pattern of fraudulent conduct. Also
reflected in the report of this study is the extent to which other
fraud violators work with one or another principal party. Finally,
this report reflects how business and professional people sometimes
engage in patterns of fraudulent conduct as principals, or in partici-
pation with other continuous violators.
1. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 501 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648).
2. In addition to time limitations, the cumbersome nature of the cross referencing
of public records on securities violators imposed its own constraints upon this study.
The effect of these constraints is that this report reflects but a fraction of the continuous
violators who would fall within the objectives of this study. However limited, the re-
sults reported here provide their own documentation of the breadth of this situation.
3. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 487.
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A. MICHAEL GARDNER
1. Gardner Securities Corporation:4 December 9, 1969 - Entry
of temporary restraining order regarding the fraud, registration and
net capital provisions of the federal securities laws against Gardner
and Gardner Securities Corporation, a registered broker-dealer of
which Gardner was the president and sole shareholder.
2. Radio Hill Mines Co., Ltd.:5 July 30, 1970 - Complaint
filed charging violations of the fraud and registration provisions of
the federal securities laws against Sidney Stein, Albert Feiffer, Nor-
man Rubinson, Michael Gardner, and others. September 16, 1971
- Indictment returned charging Stein and Rubinson with perjury
during investigation. February 5, 1973 - Guilty plea entered for
Stein. March 17, 1973 - Rubinson convicted. February 20, 1973
- Rubinson convicted of criminal contempt of preliminary injunc-
tion entered November 5, 1970.
3. Stern-Haskell, Inc., Diston Industries, Inc., Mobile Home
Ventures, Inc.:6 September 30, 1970 - Complaint filed charging
violation of the fraud and registration provision of the federal secur-
ities laws against seventeen defendants including Sidney Stein, Al-
bert Feiffer, Norman Rubinson, Michael Gardner, Lawrence
Levine, William K. Chester, Alpha Securities, Inc., C.K.W. Securi-
ties, Inc. and Zenith Securities, Ltd. May 19, 1975 - Guilty plea of'
Stein and sentencing of Stein, Feiffer, Rubinson, Levine, Chester
and others reported.
4. Control Metals Corporation:7 October 13, 1970- Complaint
filed charging violations of the fraud and registration provisions of'
the federal securities laws against nineteen defendants including
Seymour Pollack, Paul Sachs, Stanley M. Kaiser, Harold Rothman,
Robert Rapp, J.H. Rapp Co., and registered broker-dealer, Michael
Gardner, William Cudd, P.J. Gruber Co., Inc., a registered broker-
dealer, and Martin Ciment, d/b/a Crown Trading Co., a registered
broker-dealer. June 21, 1973 - Indictment returned against Pol-
lack, Sachs, Kaiser, Rothman and Cudd. December 17, 1973 -
Pollack, Sachs and Cudd convicted, Kaiser having pled guilty to
charges brought through filing of an information.
4. SEC Litig. Release No. 4497. All SEC releases cited in this Appendix are pub-
lic documents available for inspection at the regional offices of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.
5. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4710, 5169, 5759, 5769 and 5855.
6. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4768, 4781 and 6891.
7. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4780, 5951 and 6183.
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5. Spectrum, Ltd.:8 April 2, 1971 - Complaint filed charging
violations of fraud and registration provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws against twelve defendants including Louis Israel Marder,
James Morse, Michael Gardner, Michael Karfunkel,9 Stuart Schiff-
man, 10 and Quido Benigno." June 21, 1981 - Permanent injunc-
tion entered against Marder and Gardner. August 11, 1972 -
Broker-dealer registration of Gardner Securities Corp. revoked and
Michael Gardner barred from associating with any broker-dealer.
6. Vendotronics Corporation:12 October 12, 1973 - Convic-
tions entered on charges of securities fraud and conspiracy, among
other charges, against nine defendants including Anthony Sano,
Ronald Kazdin, Murray Levine, Anthony DeBenedetto, Michael
Gardner, Fred Hesse and Louis Kaye. James Morse was reported
as not being prosecuted further on the indictment in this matter
upon his guilty plea to conspiracy to violate the federal securities
laws in regard to the securities of Fleurette, Inc. (See B.9 below).
Z Patterson Corporation:13 November 21, 1974 - Indictment,
brought by the Los Angeles Organized Crime Strike Force in con-
junction with the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of California, returned charging mail and secruities fraud and con-
spiracy against eight defendants including Dalton Smith, Richard
B. Anderson, a former bank and securities broker-dealer officer,
Cleo H. Bullard, Edward A. Zuber and securities salesman Law-
rence D. Share. Michael Gardner was identified as a co-conspira-
tor. January 28, 1976 - Announcement of convictions and
sentencing of Anderson, Bullard, Zuber and Share, Dalton Smith
8. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4965 and 5057; SEA Release No. 9724.
9. On August 31, 1970 a complaint was filed charging violations of the fraud and
registration provision of the federal securities laws in the sale of securities of Select
Enterprises, Inc. against Michael Karfunkel, Joe T. Boyd, Alan I. Segal, Joseph Az-
zarone dba Karen Co., Economic Planning Corp., a registered broker-dealer, and Emer-
son Titlow, a state senator irom Nevada, among others. On September 27, 1971 the
broker-dealer registration of Azzarone was revoked, and Azzarone and Karfunkel were
barred from being associated with any broker-dealer in administrative proceedings re-
lated to Select Enterprises, Inc. and Spectrum, Ltd. SEC Litig. Release No. 4742; SEA
Release No. 9346.
10. On December 16, 1971, a complaint was filed against Stuart Schiffman, vice-
president of Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc., a registered broker-dealer, and others,
charging securities fraud in the sale of securities of All-State Metal Stamping Corp.
through Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc. SEC Litig. Release No. 5268.
11. On October 29, 1976, Quido Benigno pled guilty to conspiracy to commit se-
curities fraud upon an indictment brought by the New York Organized Crime Strike
Force against six defendants regarding sales of securities through Seed Capital Corpora-
tion, a registered broker-dealer. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 7491 and 7623.
12. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 5778 and 6226.
13. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 6316, 6563, 6624 and 7253; Indictment, CR 74-2277-
G.T., U.S.D.C., S.D. Cal.
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having died prior to trial. August and September, 1974 - Injunc-
tions entered against further violations of the fraud and registration
provisions of the federal securities laws against, among others, Dal-
ton Smith (identified as an undisclosed principal of Patterson Cor-
poration), Anderson, Bullard, Nationwide Registrar Transfer
Agency, attorney Stanley T. Traska, and former stock broker Jo-
seph Cono Caggiano.
B. FRED HESSE, aka FREDERICK VON HESSE, aka FRED
WILLIAM FUCHSHUBER HESSE
1. Texas Building Company:14 April 22, 1960 - Indictment re-
turned against five defendants including Fred Hesse charging secur-
ities and mail fraud and conspiracy.
2. Monarch Asbestos Co., Ltd.:15 June 21, 1960 - Indictment
returned against twenty-eight defendants including Stanley Ira
Younger, Fred William Fuchshuber Hesse, Louis Michael de Fi-
lippo, Arnold Naidich and Louis Michael Tortorello charging se-
curities and mail fraud, sale of unregistered securities and
conspiracy.
3. Atlas Gypsum Corporation:16 October 21, 1960 - Plea of
guilty or nolo contendere by twenty-four defendants regarding
charges of securities and mail fraud and sale of unregistered securi-
ties through J.C. Graye Company, a registered broker-dealer. De-
fendants included Stanley Ira Younger, Louis Michael de Filippo,
Murray Taylor, Fred William Fuchshuber Hesse, Arthur
Tortorello, Carmine Lombardozzi and Robert Amer.
4. Federated Holding Co., Inc.:17 July 17, 1963 - Permanent
injunction against further securities fraud entered against Fred Wil-
liam Fuchshuber Hesse in an action involving securities sold
through a registered broker-dealer.
5. Douglas Precision Parts, Inc. :18 January 21, 1964 - Indict-
ment returned on charges of securities fraud against Fred William
Fuchshuber Hesse, Lewis Mayo, 19 Arnold Naidich, Arthur
14. SEC Litig. Release No. 1657.
15. SEC Litig. Release No. 1711.
16. SEC Litig. Release No. 1813.
17. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 2260 and 2694.
18. SEC Litig. Release No. 2837
19. On April 3, 1979 a jury convicted Louis M. Mayo and James H. Dondich, aka
Harold James, of conspiracy and securities fraud arising out of sales of securities of
Reclamation District No. 2090 through Benchmark Securities, Inc., a registered broker-
dealer. On June 17, 1976 a complaint had been filed against twenty-one defendants for
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Tortorello, and Frank Sacco.
6. American Berylium & Oil Corporation:20 May 15, 1968 -
Complaint filed charging securities fraud, among other charges,
against Frederick von Hesse, aka Frederick Fuchshuber, aka Fred
Hesse, Vito Davanzo, Lawrence Gottlieb and others. July, 1970 -
Permanent injunctions entered against Hesse and Gottlieb.
Z Underwriters Investment Co.:21 November 29, 1971 - Re-
port of convictions of Arthur Tortorello and John E. Dennett for
securities and mail fraud and conspiracy. Guilty pleas were entered
by Fred Hesse, Louis Kaye and Edward Zuber,22 among others.
Indictment brought by the New York Organized Crime Strike
Force.
8. Securities Data Center, Inc., Unidat Corp., Convan Corp.,
Zenitron Corp., General Time Sharing, Inc., United States Computer
Corp. :23 February 2, 1972 - Permanent injunction entered against
attorney Emanuel Fields, Frederick Von Hesse and Louis Kaye,
and others regarding securities fraud and sale of unregistered
securities.
9. Fleurette, Inc.:24 April 4, 1973 - Indictment, brought by
the New York Organized Crime Strike Force in conjunction with
the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
returned against sixteen parties including Dennis Carroll, Louis
Kaye, Raymond Monacelli, James Morse, Norman Rubinson, Mur-
ray Taylor,25 Arthur Tortorello aka Artie Todd, Alex Alexander
and EquityFinancial Trading Corporation. Named co-conspirators
included Frederick Von Hesse, aka Fred Hesse. May 17, 1984 -
Announcement of sentencing of Dennis Carroll, James Morse, Nor-
man Rubinson and Equity Financial Trading. Monacelli and
injunction against further violations of the securities laws. SEC Litig. Release Nos.
7460 and 8717.
20. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4013, 4668 and 4689.
21. SEC Litig. Release No. 5230.
22. In January, 1975 sentences were imposed upon Edward Zuber, Burney Acton,
Michael Clegg, Joseph Azzarone, aka Karen Co., a registered broker-dealer, Anthony
Scardino and Alan Segal upon guilty verdicts or pleas to an indictment charging securi-
ties fraud, mail fraud and conspiracy in the sale of securities of Pioneer Development
Corporation. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4892 and 6869.
23. SEC Litig. Release No. 5332.
24. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 5837, 6354 and 6699.
25. On November 18, 1970 an indictment was returned charging Murray Taylor,
Vincent Lombardo, John Dioguardi, Philip Bonodono, Carmine Tramunti and others
with conspiracy, securities and mall fraud, and racketeering regarding sales of the secur-
ities of Imperial Investment Corporation. Named as co-conspirators were Sidney Stein
and Anthony Soldano. SEC Litig. Release No. 4826.
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Tortorello pled guilty and were sentenced in conjunction with other
matters. Alexander was reported as being a fugitive. January 28,
1975 - Announcement of sentencing of Murray Taylor and Louis
Kaye.
10. Vendotronics Corporation: See A.6 above, involving
Michael Gardner, Ronald Kazdin, Murray Levine and Louis Kaye.
C. LESLIE T ZACHARIAS, aka LEE ZACHARIAS, aka
LEE ZAHARIAS
1. Texas Uranium Corporation:26 May 7, 1969 - Complaint
filed charging twenty-nine defendants with violating the fraud and
registration provisions of the federal securities laws including Fran-
cis C. Lund27 and John Taylor. Charged with violating the registra-
tion provision only were: Leslie T. Zacharias, R.F.S. & Associates,
Inc. and Maurice Benjamin, aka Medwin Benjamin,28 among
others.
2. Continental Investment Corporation and Pan American In-
dustries, Inc. :29 August 5, 1969 - Complaint filed charging viola-
tions of the fraud and registration provision of the federal securities
laws against Ven G. Ryan, Donald Tarzwell, aka Michael J.
O'Shea, James W. Brewer, Houston Securities Corporation, a regis-
tered broker-dealer, George K. Waki, president of HSC, Pedro Jose
Torres Velasquez, Leslie T. Zacharias, aka Lee Zaharias, R.F.S. As-
sociates, Inc., and Wesley J. Moffatt, among others. Permanent in-
junctions entered against Ryan, Zacharias, Velasquez, Tarzwell,
Brewer, R.F.S. Associates, Inc., Waki and HSC. October 23, 1971
- Tarzwell convicted of securities fraud in the sale of securities of
Pan American Industries, Inc. February 13, 1973 - With regard
to sales of securities of CIC, James W. Brewer pled guilty to a
charge of criminal contempt of an October 18, 1968 injunction aris-
26. SEC Litig. Release No. 4310.
27. On October 3, 1975 Francis C. Lund was found guilty along with others, of
securities fraud in the sale of securities of Rio de Oro Mining Company. SEC Litig.
Release No. 7120. On April 27, 1973 permanent injunctions were entered against Fran-
cis C. Lund and Robert Bryson, among others, from further violations of the fraud and
registration provisions of the securities laws in an action involving securities of North-
west Pacific Enterprises, Inc. SEC Litig. Release No. 5890.
28. On May 7, 1971 Medwin Benjamin pled guilty to one securities fraud count
following the indictment of seven defendants in regard to the sale of securities of VTR,
Inc. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4265 and 5001. On August 4, 1973 an injunction was
entered against nine defendants, including Medwin (Maurice) Benjamin, from further
violations of the fraud and registration provisions of the securities laws in an action
regarding securities of four companies sold through a registered broker-dealer. SEC
Litig. Release Nos. 5118 and 6017.
29. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4389, 4609, 4614, 5000, 5204 and 6285.
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ing out of sales of securities of W.I.D.E., Inc.30
3. Capitol Holding Corporation:31 October 9, 1969 - Com-
plaint filed charging violations of the fraud and registration provi-
sions of the federal securities laws variously against twenty-three
defendants including David A. Wooldridge, Daniel E. Manning, at-
torney Robert A. Eisenberg, 32 William G. Louzzo, aka William G.
London, Irwin Schwartz, aka Steve Schwartz, Leslie Zacharias, aka
Lee Zacharias, Bernard Klavir, Charles Murano, Robert M.
Bryson33 and R.F.S. Associates, Inc. Between October 10, 1969
and May 8, 1980 permanent injunctions were entered against these
parties.
4. Les Studs Corporation:34 July 9, 1970 - Complaint filed
charging violations of the fraud and registration provision of the
federal securites laws against J.H. Rapp Co., a registered broker-
dealer, and Robert Rapp, the secretary-treasurer of J.H. Rapp Co.,
and charging violations of the registration provisions of those laws
only against Leslie T. Zacharias, aka Lee Zacharias and John El-
wood Dennett, among others. Permanent injunctions were entered
against these parties between August 25, 1970 and June 16, 1971.
5. Picture Island Computer Corporation:35 July 21, 1971 - In-
dictment brought by the New York Organized Crime Strike Force
in conjunction with the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York against John Lombardozzi, Peter Francis
Crosby, Hilmer Burdette Sandine and Leslie T. Zacharias, among
others, involving violation of the fraud and registration provisions
of the federal securities laws, mail fraud and conspiracy. Named
co-conspirators included Francis P. O'Neill and Byron E. Prugh.
On June 9, 1972 Lombardozzi, Sandine and Zacharias were con-
victed; Crosby failed to appear for trial and was deemed a fugitive.
30. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4141, 5182, 5775 and 5784.
31. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4434, 4448, 4496 and 4693.
32. On February 22, 1972 Robert Eisenberg was enjoined from further violations of
the securities laws in the matter of Majestic Capital Corporation. SEC Litig. Release
No. 5334.
33. On August 14, 1974 Robert Bryson was enjoined, along with Ted England,
from further violations of the fraud and registration provisions of the securities laws in
an action against eighteen defendants involving Royal Airlines, Inc. -SEC Litig. Release
Nos. 6361 and 6523.
34. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4675, 4792, 4793 and 5062.
35. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 5096 and 5434.
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D. PETER FRANCIS CROSBY
1. Texas Adams Oil Co., Inc. :36 May 24, 1970 - Conviction of
Peter Francis Crosby, among others, on charges of mail fraud, vio-
lation of the registration provisions of the federal securities laws,
and conspiracy.
2. Jefferson Research Foundation, Inc. and Jefferson Custodian
Fund, Inc. :37 November 1, 1960 - Plea of guilty by Peter Francis
Crosby to violating the fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws in managing the assets of Jefferson Custodian Fund, Inc.
which he controlled through acquisition of Jefferson Research
Foundation, Inc.
3. American Continental Industries, Inc.:38 December 2, 1968
- Complaint filed charging violations of the fraud and registration
provision of the federal securities laws in the sales of securities
against Michael LaMarca, Robert L. Taylor, Baptist Foundation of
America, Inc., World Timberland Financial Corporation, Peter
Francis Crosby, James Dondich, Nathan Rosenberg, Alessandrini
& Co., Inc., a registered broker-dealer, Louis B. Meadows & Co.,
Inc., a registered broker-dealer, Philip S. Budin and Philip S. Budin
& Co., a registered broker-dealer, among others. Permanent injunc-
tions were entered against BFA, World Timberland, Crosby,
Dondich, Rosenberg and Alessandrini & Co., Inc., among others.
Undertakings not to engage in further violations were entered into
by Budin and Budin & Co. November 20, 1972 - Indictment re-
turned against Michael LaMarca, Robert L. Taylor and others.
4. Picture Island Computer Corporation: See C.5 above (1971-
1972). Indictment of Crosby along with John Lombardozzi, Hilmer
Burdette Sandine and Leslie Zacharias.
E. LOWELL M. BIRRELL
1. Swan-Finch Oil Corp.:39 April 15, 1957 - Complaint filed
charging violations of the registration provision of the federal secur-
ities laws against Lowell M. Birrell, Gerard A. Re, Sr., a specialist
on the floor of the American Stock Exchange, Girard F. Re, Jr.,
Birnbaum & Co., a registered broker-dealer, Nahum Birnbaum, a
partner in Birnbaum & Co., Norris Adams, Ltd., a Canadian bro-
ker-dealer, Josephthal & Co., a New York Stock Exchange and
36. SEC Litig. Release No. 1709.
37. SEC Litig. Release No. 1825.
38. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 4173, 4184, 4296, 5597 and 5636.
39. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 1101, 1112, 1127, 2234, 2689 and 2741.
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American Stock Exchange firm, Anthony J. Cordano, a partner in
Josephthal & Co., Steven Randall & Co., Inc., a registered broker-
dealer, Frank M. Naft, president of Steven Randall & Co., Inc.,
Tannen & Co., a registered broker-dealer, and Philip Tannen, presi-
dent of Tannen & Co. April 2, 1962 - Indictment returned charg-
ing Gerardo A. Re, aka Jerry A. Re, Gerard F. Re, Lowell M.
Birrell and others with conspiracy to violate the fraud and registra-
tion provisions of the federal securities laws. Gerardo A. Re and
Gerard F. Re were convicted on July 11, 1963; Lowell Birrell was a
fugitive.
2. United Dye & Chemical Corporation:40 August 26, 1959 -
Indictment returned against Alexander L. Guterma, Virgil D.
Dardi, Lowell M. Birrell and others charging violations of the fraud
and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws and conspir-
acy in regard to the sale of securities and in the exercise of proxies
represented by those securities.
3. Doeskin Products, Inc.. :41 March 2, 1961 - Indictment re-
turned charging thirteen defendants including Lowell M. Birrell,
Samuel T. Smiley and Fred Tabah with violation of the fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws and mail fraud, among other
charges. As of April 19, 1961, a plea of guilty had been entered by
Smiley and Tabah to certain of the fraud charges; Birrell was a
fugitive.
4. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd. :42 July 20, 1961 - Indict-
ment returned charging fourteen defendants including Lowell M.
Birrell, J.A. Winston & Co., Inc., a registered broker-dealer, Joel
Alfred Winston and eight securities salesmen with violations of the
fraud and registration provisions of the federal securities laws, mail
fraud and conspiracy. December 28, 1967 - Conviction of Birrell
upon trial by jury.
5. Jeanette Minerals Limited:43 October 3, 1961 - Indictment
returned charging Lowell M. Birrell, and all of the defendants who
were also charged in the indictment involving American Leduc Pe-
troleums, Ltd., (see E.4 above) with conspiracy to violate the fraud
and registration provisions of the federal securities laws, and mail
and wire fraud statutes.
40. SEC Litig. Release No. 1485.
41. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 1929 and 1991.
42. SEC Litig. Release Nos. 2062 and 3897.
43. SEC Litig. Release No. 2112.
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